July 28, 2026: For the first time in history, Ukraine has used drones in a SEAD/Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses mission. The drones took down several air defense radar stations, blinding Russian air defense systems. The Ukrainian drones were able to fly deep into Russia unhindered and destroy several valuable targets. A bonus was that targets near major cities like Moscow and St Petersburg allowed Russian civilians to see how well Vladimir Putin's war against Ukraine was going.

SEAD has come a long way since 2024; Ukrainian air force pilots are seeking better equipment and weapons to deal with Russian air defenses. The NATO nations supporting Ukraine had also been working on that, beginning back in 2016, when representatives of NATO air forces met to revive and share Cold War-era knowledge for sending aircraft into heavily defended airspace. The presence of modern Russian anti-aircraft weapons in Syria and the hostile relations between Russia and NATO member Turkey made it useful to review SEAD capabilities. Going after air defense systems, also known as SEAD, rather than the World War II term Flak Suppression, was an expensive, high-priority task during the Cold War. Shutting down air defenses is only undertaken if the target being defended is important enough to warrant such an expensive application of air power. After the Cold War ended, the growing number of precision missiles seemed to be a more efficient means of targeting heavily defended targets. This spurred the development of air defense systems capable of intercepting missiles. The American Patriot SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile )'s ability to intercept SCUD missiles was the first combat example of this technique. While crude, the Patriot showed that it could be done in 1990. Since then, the similar Russian S-300 system has acquired anti-missile capabilities. That said, nearly all the NATO aircraft losses in combat since the 1990s were from low-tech weapons like machine guns and small SAMs.

The last time the United States had to do any serious SEAD was in 2003 during the invasion of Iraq. This was against second-rate Russian Cold War-era systems sold to foreign customers. But the Russians have their most modern equipment in Syria, and there was a possibility NATO aircraft might have to deal with it. So the 2016 meeting was a first step in figuring out how to handle a SEAD challenge not seen since the 1980s.

Flying into heavily defended enemy airspace is a risky business. High- and low-altitude anti-aircraft defenses are numerous. Radars are all over the place. One approach is to sneak in with small groups of up to four planes. Coming in low, a few hundred meters high or low enough to singe the treetops, the enemy has little time to react before you are past him. Zipping along at 200 meters a second, there is not much for the enemy to see, or shoot at. Using electronic mapping and navigation devices, the target is found; most of the time, the munitions are released, and an equally rapid exit is made. Few aircraft are capable of this approach, and the most modern detection and weapons systems, such as those Russia had in Syria, are designed to handle it. The Russians also claim they can detect American stealth aircraft. Designing aircraft for maximum resistance to detection to achieve stealth capability was pioneered by America in the 1970s, based on a Russian concept that the Russians could not turn into a workable aircraft. Such an airplane had a reasonable chance of penetrating enemy defenses to hit targets with a high degree of surprise. This is important, as the damage decreases with the amount of warning the target has. Five minutes of warning can reduce air base damage 40 to 80 percent depending on how many concrete aircraft shelters the base has. Stealth, using an F-117 aircraft, worked for the U.S. in the 1990 and 2003 campaigns in Iraq. Still, in case the Russians can detect and hit stealth aircraft, you must be prepared to send in larger groups of aircraft, led by lavishly equipped electronic warfare planes, to ensure successful SEAD and destruction of the target. Since this process tends to destroy many enemy ground defenses along the way, it makes subsequent raids easier.

The package of fighters and support aircraft using SEAD to reach a target is led by Wild Weasel aircraft. These have radar detection and jamming equipment that can either hide the group from enemy radar or prevent the enemy from accurately using their ground-to-air missiles. You will need fighters to deal with enemy interceptors. Thus the battle can range from 10,000 meters up to ground level. The Wild Weasels carry missiles that home in on enemy ground radars. The most dangerous opposition comes from enemy guns, which often can fire without radar in clear weather. For this reason, raids at night and in bad weather are often preferred. If all goes according to plan, the Weasels will protect the less electronically sophisticated strike aircraft on their way to the targets, where the strike aircraft release their loads. Everyone then fights their way home past a thoroughly alerted enemy. The stealth aircraft are well suited to perform the Wild Weasel role and have done so. This has become a common mission, as there are still many non-stealth strike aircraft and a need to suppress anti-aircraft defenses. For targets where surprise is not critical, stealth-led raids are the norm. This was the case in the 1990 and 2003 Gulf Wars.

Russia was striving, with some success until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, to catch up with Western strike aircraft in overall sophistication and effectiveness. Some of their new-generation strike planes, now seen in combat, were effective but not to the extent Russia hoped. Russia has its own AWACS and Wild Weasel aircraft, but both are somewhat tame compared to Western models. Russian pilots, by and large, are not as expert, experienced, or audacious as their Western counterparts. Israel and Sweden, however, produce very capable AWACS, mainly for export, that are superior to anything Russia has.

If the Russians in Syria did become targets, NATO allies had to know whether America was ready to use its latest F-22 and F-35 stealth aircraft and how that would work in cooperation with other NATO warplanes, especially the most modern ones like the Typhoon and Rafale. It is unclear how much was decided about all this, but details regarding SEAD, stealth capabilities, and plans tend to be kept secret. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians are using equipment and weapons provided by NATO countries to equip some aircraft as Wild Weasels for use against the Russian air force and air bases across the border in Russia.